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Bankruptcy
by W. Homer Drake, Jr.*
and
James W. Dilz**

I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided fifteen cases in the area of bankruptcy law. The decisions
covered a diverse array of sections of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code").'
In addition to cases with practical application within the Eleventh Circuit, several decisions have national significance. This Article is a survey
of each bankruptcy decision by the Eleventh Circuit in 1992.
II. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdictionof Related Proceeding upon Dismissal of the
Bankruptcy Case
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v.Morris (In re Morris),2 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding after the underlying Chapter 11 case was dismissed.3 Jack W. Morris, the debtor, was
a building contractor who built two housing projects for the Anniston
Housing Authority (the "Authority"). The debtor defaulted on the
projects, and his surety, Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland ("Fidelity"), funded completion of the projects in accordance with its bond.
The debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in 1985 and. initi* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1954; LL.B., 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Miami University (B.A., 1980); Ohio State University (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988)).
2. 950 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992).
3. Id. at 1535-36.
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ated an adversary proceeding against the Authority to collect the unpaid
retainage. The Chapter 11 case remained virtually dormant for three
years, and in August 1989, the Chapter 11 case was dismissed.'
A hearing on dismissal of the adversary proceeding was held in September, 1989, after dismissal of the Chapter 11 case. s Although the attorney
for the Authority argued that a state court could more appropriately try
the case, the attorney did not otherwise object to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court conducted a trial the following month,
which resulted in a judgment against the Authority in the amount of
$107,465.08.
The Authority appealed the judgment to the district court.7 The district court did not reach the merits of the appeal and held that the bankruptcy court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding by failing to expressly preserve that jurisdiction in the order
dismissing the bankruptcy case or, alternatively, that the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over the adversary
proceeding after the debtor failed to pursue the Chapter 11 case in good
faith.8
In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit followed a two-step
analysis of the jurisdictional issue.9 First, the Eleventh Circuit considered, as a matter of first impression in the circuit, whether dismissal of a
bankruptcy case required dismissal of related proceedings." Dismissal of
related proceedings normally follows dismissal of the bankruptcy case because federal jurisdiction over the related proceeding is originally premised on its nexus to the bankruptcy, but exceptions to the general rule
exist." After surveying numerous decisions from other courts, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "nothing in the statute governing jurisdiction
granted to the bankruptcy courts prohibits the continuance of federal jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding which arose in, or was related to,
4. Id. at 1533.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Fidelity also appealed from the denial of its motion to intervene in the adversary
proceeding. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 1533-35.
10. Id. at 1533-34. The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily upon the Third Circuit's decision
in In re Smith, 866 F,2d 576 (3d Cir. 1989), stating that: "The Third Circuit has previously
examined a similar issue . . .and concluded that the bankruptcy court properly retained
jurisdiction of an adversary proceeding following the discharge of the debtor." 950 F.2d at
1533. In his dissent, Judge Clark questioned the applicability of Smith, since the bankruptcy case in Smith concluded by the debtor's discharge,rather than dismissal. 950 F.2d at
1537-38 (Clark, J., dissenting). See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
11. 950 F.2d at 1534 (citing Smith, 866 F.2d at 580).
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a bankruptcy case following dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy
case. '" 1 The court concluded, therefore, that "the dismissal of an underly'ing bankruptcy case does not automatically strip a federal court of jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding which was related to the bankruptcy
case at the time of its commencement."1

3

The decision whether to retain

1
jurisdiction should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 4
The second step in the Eleventh Circuit's analysis was to determine
whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction in this instance.15 The factors to be considered in exercising such
discretionary jurisdiction are: "(1) judicial economy; (2) fairness and convenience to the litigants; and (3) the degree of difficulty of the related
legal issues involved," 16 The adversary proceeding was ready for trial at
the time the bankruptcy -court dismissed the Chapter 11 case, and the
bankruptcy court based its retention of jurisdiction on judicial economy
and fairness and convenience to the litigants." Under those circumstances, giving proper deference to the bankruptcy court,"' the Eleventh
Circuit found that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by
trying the adversary proceeding, even though the difficulty of the legal
issues favored a trial in the state court.19 The Eleventh Circuit remanded
the proceedings for the district court's consideration of the merits of the
appeal.2 0
Judge Clark rendered a sharp dissenting opinion.2 ' Judge Clark asserted that the case authority relied upon by the majority was not applicable.22 Furthermore, he took issue with the key factual predicate that

12. Id. (citations omitted).
13. Id. The district court analogized ' the adversary proceeding to a pendent claim in a
civil suit and reasoned that the bankruptcy court lost jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding by failing to expressly state in its dismissal order that the adversary proceeding
would be retained. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this reasoning since the adversary proceeding and bankruptcy proceeding were two separate cases. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1535 (citing Smith, 866 F.2d at 580).
17. Id. This factual setting should be compared with Smith, where the trial of the adversary proceeding had already been completed at the time of the debtor's discharge. Id.
18. The Eleventh Circuit quickly disposed of the district court's finding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by retaining the adversary proceeding after the debtor's
failure to pursue the bankruptcy case in good faith, stating simply that "the decision of the
bankruptcy court was entitled to deference." Id.
19. Id. at 1535-36. "Although the Authority and Fidelity argue that the difficulty of the
legal issues favors a trial in state court, we are-not persuaded that this factor is so overwhelming that it outweighs the .others." Id. at 1535.
20. Id. at 1536.
21. Id. at 1536-40.
22. Id. at 1537.
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the adversary proceeding was ready for trial when the bankruptcy case
was dismissed.2 3 The net result, Judge Clark contended, was the creation
of an exception which consumed the general rule that a bankruptcy court
should not retain jurisdiction over adversary proceedings after the bankruptcy court dismisses the underlying bankruptcy case.24 This result
would not have been "so egregious" to Judge Clark had the debtor been
required to pay creditors from the proceeds of any final judgment. 25
Indeed, as pointed out by Judge Clark in his dissent, Morris broadly
empowers a bankruptcy court or district court to retain jurisdiction over
related proceedings after dismissal of the bankruptcy case itself. The key
is that this exercise of subject matter jurisdiction is discretionary.From a
practical standpoint, this power will most likely be asserted sparingly.
B.

Claims Between Two Non-Debtor Entities

In United States v. Challenge Air International,Inc. (In re Challenge
Air International,Inc.),2 6 the debtor, Challenge Air International, Inc.
("Challenge Air"), operated a commercial airline and had an agreement
with American Express Travel Related Services Co. ("American Express"), to accept American Express cards for the purchase of its airline
services. The agreement entitled American Express to withhold payments
to Challenge Air as a reserve fund against chargebacks by cardholders. As
of October 28, 1987, American Express owed Challenge Air approximately
27
$162,000 from the reserve fund.
Meanwhile, Challenge Air failed to pay federal taxes for the first and
second quarters' of 1987. After the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") assessed the amounts due, the IRS filed tax liens against Challenge Air's
property. The IRS issued a notice of levy to American Express on October 28, 1987, seeking to collect taxes totaling $456,456.46. The levy attached to "'all money or other obligations'" owed by American Express
to Challenge Air. 2' American Express did
not honor the levy and refused
2
to release the reserve fund to the IRS. 0
Challenge Air filed for relief under Chapter 11 on November 23, 1987.30
After the court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee, Challenge Air and the
trustee filed an adversary proceeding against American Express and the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1540.
Id.
Id.
952 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id.
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IRS for turnover of the reserve fund.,' In the adversary proceeding, the
IRS sought to hold American Express liable for the tax, interest, and penalties under section 6332(d) of the Internal Revenue Code3 ' for failure to
honor the levy.3 3 The bankruptcy court granted turnover of the reserve

fund to the bankruptcy estate and found that American Express had no
liability to the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d).34 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment for turnover to the bankruptcy estate.3 6 The Eleventh Circuit
also upheld the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to decide that American
Express had no liability to the IRS under section 6332(d).3 ' The court
stated that "[j)urisdiction of the bankruptcy court is limited to matters
affecting the estate and the parties' conflicting claims to estate property."3 Since the IRS was attempting to penalize American Express for
failing to honor the levy upon the reserve fund, which was ultimately held
to be property of the estate subject to turnover, the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction to deny the relief the IRS sought against American Express
under section 6332(d).3 9 The Eleventh Circuit was careful to point out
that the bankruptcy court only determined whether American Express
40
was liable under section 6332(d) from the date of the bankruptcy filing.
The decision implies that the bankruptcy court would not have had jurisdiction to determine the liability of American Express under section
period from the date of the levy to the date of the bank6332(d) for the
4
ruptcy filing. 1

III.

AUTOMATIC STAY

A. Domestic Relations Proceeding
In Carver v. Carver,2 the Eleventh Circuit delivered an important
opinion on the frequent tension between the federal bankruptcy law and
domestic relations under state law. In October 1988, Edward and Paulette
31.

Id.

32. 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d) (1988).
33.
34.

952 F.2d at 386.
Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 387. See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
37. 952 F.2d at 387.
38. Id. at 388 (citing Gallucci v. Grant (In re Gallucci), 931 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.
1991)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 954 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Carver were granted a divorce. The court ordered the debtor, Edward
Carver, to pay child support and to make mortgage payments on the former marital residence, which remained in the possession of his ex-wife.
The debtor fell behind on mortgage payments, and the mortgage company initiated foreclosure proceedings. In February 1989, the debtor filed
a Chapter 13 petition without listing his ex-wife as a creditor or otherwise
giving her notice of the bankruptcy. The ex-wife proceeded to initiate a
contempt action against the debtor in the Family Court of Akin County,
South Carolina, on March 10, 1989. The attorney for the ex-wife learned
of the debtor's bankruptcy filing from a third party on March 13, 1989.
Nevertheless, the hearing on the contempt matter went forward in the
family court on March 23, 1989."'
The debtor was present at the contempt hearing but was not represented by counsel. The family court found the debtor in contempt, sentencing him to six months in jail with the provision that the sentence
would be suspended upon payment of all arrearages and charges due the
mortgage holder. After the debtor spent seven and one-half days in jail,
his current wife borrowed $8,792.48 from her father to make the payment
4
necessary to secure the debtor's release from jail.j
Upon the debtor's release from jail, he filed an action in the bankruptcy
court against the ex-wife and her attorneys for damages for their alleged
willful violation of the automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Code." The
bankruptcy court found a willful violation of the automatic stay and
awarded the debtor $18,295.78 in damages. 46 The district court upheld
the finding of a willful stay violation but modified the damage amount.4 7
The initial question discussed by the Eleventh Circuit was whether the
contempt action in Family Court was excepted from the automatic stay.48
Section 362(b)(2) of the Code 49 excepts from the automatic stay "the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not
property of the estate."6 0 This section was of no help to the ex-wife and
her attorneys, since the exception only applies to collection efforts directed at property that is not property of the estate, and in a Chapter 13
case, property of the estate includes earnings acquired by the debtor after
the bankruptcy filing." "Under this statutory scheme, the exception in 11
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51,

Id. at 1574-75.
Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1575-76; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
954 F.2d at 1576.
Id.
Id. at 1576-77.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (1988).
954 F.2d at 1576 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (1988)).
Id. at 1577 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1988)).
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U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) has little or no practical effect in Chapter 13 situations.""2 The contempt action in family court, therefore, was technically
in violation of the automatic stay.s3
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the ex-wife should have moved for
relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d) of the Code.' Situations involving alimony, maintenance, or support constitute "cause" for
lifting the automatic stay, and such relief should be liberally granted.0s
Despite the fact that the ex-wife did not follow these recommended procedures, a further inquiry was necessary to determine whether sanctions
were appropriate for the technical stay violation.""
According to the Eleventh Circuit, a bankruptcy court must consider
the well-grounded federal policy of abstention in domestic relations matters before exercising its jurisdiction. 7 In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts traditionally abstain from deciding "'cases involving divorce
and alimony, child custody, visitation rights, establishment of paternity,
child support, and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.' "58 The reasons for this abstention policy
include "the strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial
supervision by the state, and the problem of congested dockets in federal
courts." s The Eleventh Circuit stated that the same rationale applies to
abstention by the bankruptcy courts."0
The general abstention provision in bankruptcy proceedings is 28
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), 1 which states: "'Nothing in this section prevents a
district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with
State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
This abstention provision may be invoked upon the
under title 11.' ,,02
request of a party or sua sponte by the court."3 Whether or not a party
affirmatively moves for abstention, the Eleventh Circuit stated that bankruptcy and district courts should "tread very carefully" before imposing

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60,
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1577-78; 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
954 F.2d at 1578.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Id. (quoting Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988).
954 F.2d at 1579 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988)).
Id.

1080

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

contempt64 sanctions in matters involving alimony, maintenance, or
support.
Under the facts of Carver, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
bankruptcy court should have abstained from the contempt action
against the ex-wife and her attorneys.'5 The Eleventh Circuit stopped
short of mandating abstention every time a domestic relations issue arises
and stated that, in appropriate circumstances when the purposes of the
automatic stay would be served, and the court'would not be required to
delve too deeply into family law, abstention might not be necessary."
The court absolved the creditor in Carver of liability for a violation of
the automatic stay. This decision should not be construed, however, to
mean that the automatic stay can simply be ignored in all domestic relations matters. Instead, as suggested by the Eleventh Circuit, relief from
the automatic stay for "cause" under section 362(d) of the Code should
be sought by a party to the domestic relations dispute and freely granted
by the bankruptcy court.

B. Administrative Freeze
In B.F. Goodrich Employees Federal Credit Union v. Patterson (In re
Patterson),s7 the Eleventh Circuit held that the freeze of a debtor's
checking account was a violation of the automatic stay of section 362(a).18
The debtors, Fred C. Patterson and Mary L. Patterson, were members of
the B.F. Goodrich Employees Federal Credit Union (the "Credit Union")
where they maintained a savings account and a checking account. The
accounts served as collateral for a loan taken out from the Credit Union.
The debtors filed for relief under Chapter 13, and when the Credit Union
received notice of the bankruptcy filing, it blocked all activity in the
69
debtors' accounts.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1580. The purpose of the automatic stay was not served by the damage award,
because other creditors were not harmed by the action in family court. Furthermore, the
debtor was to blame for much of the situation, since he was repeatedly delinquent on his
support obligations. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the debtor was attempting
to use bankruptcy as a tactical weapon in the domestic relations dispute with his ex-wife.
Id.
66. Id.
67. 967 F.2d 505 (lth Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 511; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
69. 967 F.2d at 507. The debtors were given notice that all services at the Credit Union
had been suspended as a result of their bankruptcy filing. The Credit Union refused to cash
the debtors' checks. At least six checks written by the debtors were returned, causing the
debtors to incur returned check charges, and the debtors were prohibited from making deposits to cover the checks. Id. The Credit Union filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
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The debtors filed an adversary proceeding against the Credit Union for
turnover of the frozen funds7" and a second adversary proceeding to restrain the Credit Union from closing their accounts.7 1 After the bankruptcy court held a hearing, it enjoined the Credit Union from closing the
debtors' accounts and awarded the debtors damages and attorney's fees
for violating the automatic stay and wrongfully discriminating against the
debtors under section 525 of the Code.72 The district court on appeal affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court.73
The Eleventh Circuit found that the Credit Union's freeze of the debtors' accounts violated at least three different subsections of the automatic
stay of section 362(a)."4 Specifically, the freeze was an improper exercise
of control over property of the estate in violation of section 362(a)(3); an
act to enforce a lien against property of the estate in violation of section
362(a)(4); and an act.to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the bankruptcy case in violation of section
362(a)(6).75 These violations of the automatic stay made it unnecessary
for the court to determine whether the freeze was a violation of section
362(a)(7),7 0 which stays setoff by a creditor."
case showing the balance due on the loan less credits for the funds in the "frozen" accounts.
Id. at 508.
70. The turnover action was later withdrawn, and the debtors consented to a motion for
relief from the automatic stay by the Credit Union to apply the frozen funds against the
loan. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(b) No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under
this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt (1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or bankrupt under
the Bankruptcy Act;...
11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(1).
73. 967 F.2d at 508.
74. Id. at 511.
75. Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (4), (6) (1988). These sections state as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of

-

...

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate; ...

(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; ....
11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (4), (6) (1988).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1988).
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Credit Union's argument that the
freeze was necessary to protect its right of setoff.78 Although the Code
generally preserves a right of setoff under nonbankruptcy law through
section 553(a), 7 9 setoff under that section is expressly conditioned upon
relief from the automatic stay.s° Thus, the Code contemplates a judicial
determination before setoff is exercised, rather than the self-help remedy
afforded by a freeze.81
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award of damages and attorney's
fees against the Credit Union for its violation of the automatic stay82 and
its discrimination against the debtors in violation of section 525(b) of the
Code. 8 Yet, to give future guidance to creditors holding deposit accounts
as collateral, the Eleventh Circuit offered a practical solution intended to
balance the creditor's rights with the need for judicial approval of setoff.84
The procedure suggested by the court is for the creditor to file an ex
parte motion under sections 362(f)" or 363(e), 8 and accompany the mo77. 967 F.2d at 513. "Although we do not address here the issue of whether a freeze
constitutes a setoff, per se, our opinion eviscerates the logic of those opinions which answer
this question in the negative." Id.

78. Id. at 508-11. In fact, the Credit Union did not have a valid right of setoff under
state law because the debt was not mature. Id. at 510. But that fact was not essential to the
court's holding that the freeze was contrary to the Code. Id.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(a)Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this
title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing
by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case ....
Id.
80. 967 F.2d at 509 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988)).
81. Id. at 510.
82. Id. at 514.
83. Id. The Credit Union's action against the debtors was discriminatory, in violation of
section 525(b), because the debtors' membership privileges were terminated solely as a result of their bankruptcy filing and not as a result of any loss they caused the Credit Union
to suffer. Id.
84. Id. at 511.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 362(f) (1988). This section provides:
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court with or without a hearing, shall
grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if
such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and
a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.

Id.
86.

11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). This section provides:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of
an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be
used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall
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tion with payment of the debtor's funds into the registry of the bankruptcy court.8 7 This procedure would not violate the automatic stay because it represents "an abdication: of control by the creditor in favor of
the bankruptcy court's determination of the disposition of the funds." 8
Although courts in other jurisdictions permit an administrative freeze
on a debtor's account, Pattersonmakes these cases inapposite within the
Eleventh Circuit. A creditor faced with this situation who asserts control
over the debtor's account without following the recommended procedure
of filing a motion and paying the funds into the registry of the bankruptcy court does so at its peril.
IV.

OBTAINING CREDIT: CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION

The Eleventh Circuit decided in Shapiro v. Saybrook Manufacturing
Co. (Matter of Saybrook Manufacturing Co.)s that the use of cross-collateralization to obtain post-petition financing is impermissible under the
Code." Cross-collateralization has been a controversial practice.'" By disallowing cross-collateralization, Saybrook puts an end to the controversy
within the Eleventh Circuit.
The debtors, Saybrook Manufacturing Co. and related companies, filed
petitions for relief under Chapter 11 on December 22, 1988. At the time
of the bankruptcy filings, the debtors owed Manufacturers Hanover approximately $34 million. The value of the collateral securing the claim of
Manufacturers Hanover was only $10 million, meaning that the creditor
was undersecured by approximately $24 million. One day after the bankruptcy proceedings commenced, the debtors filed a motion for the use of
cash collateral and for authorization to incur secured debt. The financing
proposal submitted to the bankruptcy court was for Manufacturers Hanover to lend an additional $3 million to the debtors, in exchange for which
Manufacturers Hanover would receive a security interest in all of the
debtors' property to secure both the pre-petition debt and the post-petition advance."
Two unsecured creditors, Seymour and Jeffrey Shapiro, objected to the
financing arrangement.0 The bankruptcy court overruled the objections
prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate
protection of such interest.

Id.
87. 967 F.2d at 511.
88. Id. at 512.
89. 963 F.2d 1490 (l1th Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 1496.
91. Id. at 1493.
92. Id. at 1491.
93. Id. at 1492.
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and entered an order approving the financing." The creditors appealed to
the district court, but the district court dismissed their appeal on grounds
of mootness." In order to reach the merits of the appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit used its conclusion on the legality of cross-collateralization as the
basis for its ruling on mootness."
The Eleventh Circuit described the type of cross-collateralization at issue in this case as Texlon-type cross-collateralization, defined as follows:
[I]n return for making new loans to a debtor in possession under Chapter
XI, a financing institution obtains a security interest on all assets of the
debtor, both those existing at the date of the order and those created in
the course of the Chapter XI proceeding, not only for the new loans, the
propriety
of which is not contested, but [also] for existing indebtedness
97
to it.

This type of cross-collateralization is distinguishable from the securing of
post-petition debt with pre-petition collateral, which was not at issue in
this appeal."
The Eleventh Circuit surveyed the cases on cross-collateralization and
noted that, even though the practice has been approved by several bankruptcy courts," those courts were generally reluctant to do so.' 00 To obtain approval of cross-collateralization, the debtor and secured creditor
had to meet a stringent four-part test.101 No other circuit court had directly approved the validity of Texon-type cross-collateralization. °2
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this type of cross-collateralization
was illegal per se on two grounds.0 8 First, cross-collateralization is not
authorized under section 364 of the Code.'0 4 "By their express terms, sections 364(c) & (d) apply only to future-i.e., post-petition-extensions of
credit. They do not authorize the granting of liens to secure pre-petition
loans."'0 Second, cross-collateralization cannot be approved under the
bankruptcy court's inherent equitable power because it directly contra94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1493. See infra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
97. 963 F.2d at 1491-92 (quoting Otte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In
re Texion Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1979)).
98. Id. at 1492.
99. Id. at 1493 (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983)).
102. Id. at 1494.
103. Id. at 1494-96.
104. Id. at 1494-95; 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
105. 963 F.2d at 1495; 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c)(1), (2), (3); 364(d)(1)(A), (B); 364(d)(2)
(1988). These subsections provide:

19931
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0 The Code calls for creditors
venes the priority scheme of the Code.0'
within a given class to be treated equally, 0 7 but cross-collateralization
gives the lender a priority over all other unsecured claims. 08 To create
such priorities with a class of claims exceeds the equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court. 09 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the contention that
cross-collateralization furthers the objective of helping Chapter 11 debtors reorganize, stating that such an end does not justify the use of means
so fundamentally at odds with the Code's rules of priority and
distribution.' 0

V.

RECOVERY OF ASSETS OF THE ESTATE

A. Fraudulent Conveyances
The decision in Grissom u. Johnson (Matter of Grissom)"' amplifies
that there is not a seventy-percent test or other mathematical formula for
determining whether property sold through a lawful foreclosure brought a
"reasonably equivalent value" for purposes of section 548(a),1 2 the fraud(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section
503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt (1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise subject
to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on' property of the estate that is subject to a
lien.
(d)(1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit
or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate
that is subject to a lien only if (A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien
on the .property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed
to be granted.
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of proof on
the issue of adequate protection.
11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c)(1), (2), (3); 364(d)(l)(A), (B); 364(d)(2).
106. 963 F.2d at 1495-96.
107. Id. at 1496 (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 507.0212] (15th ed. 1992)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1495 (quoting In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 409 (E.D.N.C. 1986)).
110. Id. at 1496.
111. 955 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1992).
112. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A); 548(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii) (1988). These sections provide:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
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ulent conveyance provision in the Code." 3 In 1971, the debtor, Johnny
Grissom, borrowed $18,000 from Citizens & Southern National Bank
("C&S") secured by his residence. After the loan was in default, C&S
conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the residence on April 4, 1989.
The property was sold to third-party bidders, Birnet and Leslie Johnson,
for $14,059, the amount of the C&S debt. One day later, the debtor and
his wife filed for relief under Chapter 13. The Grissoms filed a complaint
in the bankruptcy court against C&S and the Johnsons to set aside the
4
foreclosure sale.'
The only issue in dispute before the bankruptcy court was whether the
sale price of $14,059 was the "reasonably equivalent value" of the residence."' The bankruptcy court found the value of the residence to be
$26,000."' Since $14,059 was less than seventy percent of $26,000, the
bankruptcy court nullified the foreclosure sale in reliance upon Durrett v.
Washington National Insurance Co." 7 The district court affirmed, taking
the seventy-percent test from Durrett as a given and finding that the evidence supported the valuation of the residence by the bankruptcy
court."I'
In reversing the lower courts, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its previous rejection of a purely mathematical approach to the avoidance of lawful foreclosures in Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton)." 9 The court in
Littleton adopted a test for determining reasonably equivalent value
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily -..
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(1) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
Id. (emphasis added).
113. 955 F.2d at 1444.

114. Id. at 1443.
115, Id.
116. Id. at 1444.
117. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). In dictum, the Fifth Circuit stated: "We have been
unable to locate a decision of any district or appellate court . . . which has approved the
transfer [of a debtor's property] for less than 70% of the market value of the property." Id.

at 203:. Thus evolved the so-called "Durrett 70% rule." 955 F.2d at 1444.
118.
119.

955 F.2d at 1445.
888 F.2d 90 (11th Cir. 1989).
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"'based upon all the facts and circumstances of each case' """ and established that the seventy-percent test was merely a guideline.," Littleton
validated a foreclosure sale at 63.49% of the property's value, but an important factor in Littleton was that the foreclosure also resulted in the
termination of junior liens.2 2
In Grissom the Eleventh Circuit went one step further by establishing a
presumption that a legitimate foreclosure sale will bring, a reasonably
equivalent value, absent fraud, collusion, or other irregular or unlawful
procedures.123 Thus, compliance with state foreclosure law will not conclusively deem a foreclosure sale to be immune from attack, nor will the
failure of the foreclosure sale to bring a fixed percentage of value render
the sale avoidable. 2 ' Instead, a legitimate foreclosure sale carries a "presumption of reasonableness" requiring the trustee seeking to avoid the
sale to "establish specific factors which undermine confidence in the reasonableness of the foreclosure sale price.' 25 All facts and circumstances
must be considered. '2 Relevant factors include the bargaining position of
the parties to the foreclosure sale, the marketability of the property, the
fact that foreclosure prices are notoriously below market, whether the
foreclosing party obtained a fair appraisal prior to .the sale, the extent to
sale was advertised, and the number of serious bidwhich the foreclosure
12 7
ders at the sale.

The rationale for the court's decision is that it strikes the appropriate
balance between preserving the rights of lenders and upholding the finality of foreclosure sales, on one hand, and protecting bankruptcy estates
from depletion.'2 8 To the extent Grissom makes it more difficult to set
aside foreclosures, it is arguably beneficial to the lending community.
However, another facet of the decision in Grissom may have more significant ramificatidns for foreclosing creditors.
The Eleventh Circuit stated in dictum that C&S could be held liable
under section 550(a)(1) of the Code' 20 if the foreclosure sale would be
120. 955 F.2d at 1444 (quoting 888 F.2d at 93).
121. Id. at 1445 (citing 888 F.2d at 93).
122. Id. at 1445-46.
123. Id. at 1446.
124. Id. at 1447.
125. Id. at 1446.
126. Id. (citing 888 F.2d at 93).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1446-47.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). This section provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if
the court so orders, the value of such property, from -
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finally set aside following remand of the case.' 0 This liability is only theoretical if the property is conveyed back to the estate upon avoidance of
the transfer. But, if the Johnsons re-convey the property to bona fide
purchasers for value from whom the residence cannot be recovered, C&S
could have exposure for $11,941, the difference between the $26,000 valuation and the foreclosure price of $14,059. Accordingly, lenders should be
extremely careful when foreclosing on property whose market value significantly exceeds the secured debt. In addition to obtaining a fair appraisal beforehand, the lender might want to consider advertising the sale
more widely than the minimal requirements under state foreclosure
procedures.
B. Turnover
The primary issue before the court in United States v. Challenge Air
International, Inc. (In re Challenge Air International, Inc.),"' was
whether the reserve fund held by American Express under a credit card
merchant agreement with the debtor, a commercial airline, was property
of the estate subject to turnover under section 542(a) of the Code132 following a levy upon the reserve fund by the IRS.' The bankruptcy court
3
authorized turnover, and the district court affirmed.1 4
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the IRS argued that the interest it
acquired in the reserve fund through its pre-petition levy prevailed over
the right of turnover under section 542(a), but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Whiting Pools' 35 was dispositive.' 30 In Whiting Pools the Court held that
property of the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 11 reorganization included property of the debtor that was seized by a secured creditor prior
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made;...

Id.
130. 955 F.2d at 1449 n.8.
131. 952 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 26-41.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1988). This section provides:
(a)Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than
a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that
the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor
may exempt, under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
Id.
133. 952 F.2d at 386.
134. Id.
135. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
136. 952 F.2d at 386.
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to the bankruptcy filing.'37 The IRS was given no special immunity from
the reach of the bankruptcy turnover provision.13 Although the IRS was
entitled to adequate protection of its interest in the seized property, it
could not withhold the property from the debtor's efforts to reorganize .,
The IRS attempted to distinguish Whiting Pools on the grounds that it
involved the seizure of tangible personal property, whereas the case at
hand involved a levy upon cash equivalent property; however, this did not
persuade the Eleventh Circuit. 4" The Supreme Court did not evidence
any intent to limit its decision in Whiting Pools by the type of property
involved. 141 Moreover, the enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code"4 2 " 'do not transfer ownership of the property to the IRS.' ",43
Case law makes clear that an administrative levy by the IRS is merely a
"provisional remedy" that does not involve a determination of the government's rights in the seized property relative to other claimants.' 4 For
those reasons, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the fund was subject
to turnover in spite of the levy by the IRS."'
VI. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND LEASES
The question presented in Citizens & Southern National Bank v.
Thomas B. Hamilton Co. (In re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.)' 46 was whether
a credit card agreement between a merchant and a merchant bank constituted a contract to extend "financial accommodations" within the meaning of sections 365(c)(2)" 7 and 365(e)(2)(B)' s such that the credit card
137. Id. (citing 462 U.S. at 209).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 462 U.S. at 212).
140. Id. at 387.
141. Id. at 386-87.
142. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
143. 952 F.2d at 387 (quoting 462 U.S. at 210).
144. Id. (quoting United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 721
(1985)).
145. Id.
146. 969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1988). This section provides:
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if -...
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or
to issue a security of the debtor; ....
Id. (emphasis added).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B) (1988). This section provides:
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or
in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not
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agreement could not be assumed by the merchant in a Chapter 11 case. 49
The debtor, Thomas B. Hamilton Co., was a merchant engaged in the
business of retail sales of sterling silver products. The majority of the
debtor's business consisted of credit card sales received through telephone and mail orders. The debtor had a Card Program Member Agreement through Citizens & Southern National Bank ("C&S") which permitted the debtor to accept its customers' MasterCard and Visa charge cards
in retail sales transactions.' The Card Program Member Agreement was
typical of arrangements between merchants and financial institutions
dealing in credit card transactions.' 5'
The debtor and C&S functioned under the terms of the Card Program
Member Agreement for more than nine years. After the debtor filed a
Chapter 11 petition in June 1989, C&S requested that the debtor submit
a new application for a credit card merchant agreement. In reviewing the
new application, C&S determined that the debtor's unstable financial
condition increased its own financial risks, and in October 1989, C&S rejected the debtor's new application. C&S then moved for relief from the
automatic stay to terminate the existing agreement. 5 2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court concluded that the agreement did
not fall within the ambit of sections 365(c)(2) and 365(e)(2)(B) and,
therefore, could be assumed by the debtor.'5 3 The bankruptcy court denied the motion by C&S to terminate the agreement, and the district
court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court."'
be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of

the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned
on

-

(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if - . . .
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or

to issue a security of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1)(A), (B), (C); 365(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
149. 969 F.2d at 1014.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1017.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1018.
154. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with the observation that the
Code does not define the term "financial accommodations.""' Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit looked at the legislative history to section 365,15 6 the
leading treatise on bankruptcy law, 18 7 and case law,188 all of which narrowly construe the term."8 9 The cases distinguish contracts for which the
extension of credit is a primary purpose from those in which the extension of credit is merely incidental, with only the former constituting contracts to extend "financial accommodations" within the meaning of sections 365(c)(2) and 365(e)(2)(B).I60 The types of. contracts routinely held
to fall within these provisions include "loan commitments, guaranty and
surety contracts, and other contracts the principal purpose of which is to
extend financing to or guaranty the financial obligations of the debtor." '
Applying this analytical framework to the facts, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that-the purpose of the Card Program Member Agreement between the debtor and C&S was not to provide financing.1 2 The specific
terms of the agreement "do not evidence any intent on the part of C&S to
extend, credit to [the debtor]. ' '118 The potential liability to C&S for

chargebacks was only incidental to the overall relationship between the
debtor and C&S.1 8 ' Thus, the court held that the Card Program Member

Agreement did not constitute a contract for "financial accommodations"
within the meaning of sections 365(c)(2) and 365(e)(2)(B).' "
The Eleventh Circuit buttressed its conclusion with the .policy consideration of furthering the financial rehabilitation of retail merchants. 1"
Unless credit card merchant agreements are deemed to be assumable, rehabilitation would be virtually impossible for a merchant dependent upon
credit card sales. 7 The court added that its conclusion did not impose an
unreasonable burden on merchant banks, because assumption of the
credit card merchant agreement was subject to approval of the bankruptcy court under section 365(a),' " with assumption being conditioned
155. Id.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.05111 (15th ed. 1992)).
158. Id. at 1018-19 n.7 (citations omitted).
159. id.
160. Id. at 1018-19.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1020.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1021; 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). This section provides: "(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section,
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upon the curing of defaults as required by section 365(b)." 9 Under certain circumstances not present in the instant case, the court stated that
assumption of such an agreement may be denied if continued
perform170
ance would put an unreasonable risk on the merchant bank.
VII.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

A. Administrative Expense
The question presented in Alabama Surface Mining Commission v.
N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.)171 was whether penalties incurred post-petition for environmental violations by a 17strip
mining com2
pany were entitled to administrative expense priority.
The debtor, N.P. Mining Co., was engaged in the business of strip mining coal. The Alabama Surface Mining Commission (the "Commission")
is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Ala-.
bama Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.17 In order to insure
reclamation of land that has been strip mined, the regulatory scheme in
Alabama requires that each licensed operator purchase reclamation
bonds. In this instance, the debtor's insurer honored the bond by paying
the state of Alabama more than $2 million for compensatory damages to
the land mined by the debtor. Therefore, the fines by the Commission in
question were solely punitive with no connection to the actual cost of re1 74
storing the environment.
The debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition on February 6, 1987. After a
time, the debtor became unable to mine coal of a sufficient quality to
the trustee, subject to the courts approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor." Id. (emphasis added).
169. 969 F.2d at 1021; 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time
of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or
lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease . . ..
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A), (B), (C).
170. 969 F.2d at 1021.
171. 963 F.2d 1449 (l1th Cir. 1992).
172. Id. at 1451-52.,
173. ALA. CODE §§ 9-16-70, et seq. (1975).
174. 963 F.2d at 1450.
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fulfill its primary contract, but the contract was maintained by brokering
coal from another company at a profit. A Chapter 11 trustee was appointed on June 15, 1988. By that point, the debtor's mining operations
had ceased completely, and the case was ultimately converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate had assets of
approximately $400,000 to $500,000.""
During the pendency of the case, the Commission assessed penalties of
$2,349,000 for which the Commission sought allowance as an administrative expense priority under section 503(b) of the Code. 77 The Commission assessed a portion of the penalties post-petition for the failure to
abate pre-petition violations, which the Eleventh Circuit summarily excluded from priority treatment. 177 At stake, however, were $102,850 in
penalties incurred while post-petition mining operations were ongoing,
in fines incurred after mining operations were
and $1,949,400
8
terminated.

7

First, the Commission argued that the penalties for post-petition violations qualified as administrative expenses under the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Reading Co. v. Brown,' 9 in which tort claims
against a bankruptcy estate for compensatory damages were payable as
administrative expenses despite the absence of any benefit to the estate.1 80 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Reading, since that decision to
allow compensatory damages as administrative expenses was predicated
on "'fairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent.' "' Reading did not open the door for all liabilities incurred by a bankruptcy estate to be treated as administrative expenses without a showing of benefit
to the estate. 82 Fairness would not be served by allowing all of the Commission's penalties to be paid on an administrative priority basis, because
83
the penalties did not represent compensation for damage or injury.'
Second, the Commission argued that administrative expense status for
the penalties would further the Code's policy in favor of environmental
175. Id. at 1450-51.
176. Id. at 1450; 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part: "(b)
After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims
allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including - (1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services ren" 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
dered after the commencement of the case; ...
177. 963 F.2d at 1459.
178. Id. at 1451.
179. 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
180. 963 F.2d at 1453.
181. Id. at 1456 (quoting 391 U.S. at 477).
182. Id. at 1455.
183. Id.
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protection."' This contention was also unpersuasive to the Eleventh Circuit, because the environmental violations by the debtor did not pose a
threat to public health or safety, and the fines were not calculated to pay
for environmental cleanup. 85 Therefore, the policy in favor of environmental protection did not justify giving these penalties an administrative
expense priority."'0
Finally, the Commission argued that the penalties should be deemed
administrative expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 959(b),' 87 which requires a
trustee to "manage and operate the property in his possession

. . .

ac-

cording to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such
property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor
would be bound to do if in possession thereof."'18 The Eleventh Circuit
sustained this argument, holding that "punitive civil penalties assessed as
a consequence of the 'operation of a bankruptcy estate's business are 'actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate' under section
503(b)(1)(A).'"" The court concluded, however, that the business was not
being operated within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) when coal was
merely being brokered."90 Accordingly, the administrative expense liability for fines was limited to those penalties assessed for mining violations
during the operation of a mine by the debtor in possession of the
trustee."'
B. Tax Penalties
In United States v. Sanford (In re Sanford),""' the Eleventh Circuit
held that certain tax penalties must be waived or imposed in their entirety and could not otherwise be adjusted by the bankruptcy court under
,its equitable powers." 2a The debtor, Arthur Carol Sanford, was an elderly
man who was forced into bankruptcy involuntarily in 1989. As of the date
of the bankruptcy filing, the debtor had not filed income tax returns for
the 1983 through 1988 tax years. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
•filed a claim for unpaid taxes in the amount of $417,853.26 along with
penalties in the aggregate amount of $125,573.89 under 26 U.S.C.
184.

Id. at 1453.

185. Id. at 1458.
186. Id.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
963 F.2d at 1458.
Id. at 1459 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988)).
Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1461.
979 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1513.
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26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(2) for

failure to timely pay taxes,"' and 26 U.S.C. § 6654(a) for underpayment
of estimated tax.'
Although the debtor did not dispute the tax liability or the accuracy of
the penalty computations, he requested the bankruptcy court to "reduce
or eliminate" the penalties based upon his "good cause" for failing to file
returns or pay taxes for the applicable years. 97 The bankruptcy court reduced the penalties by approximately two-thirds to $36,796.18. The IRS
appealed to the district court, contending that the penalties had to be
either allowed or disallowed in total. The district court affirmed, holding
that the bankruptcy court had the equitable power to partially disallow
the tax penalties.198
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower courts and remanded the case
for further findings on whether the debtor had proven facts demonstrating that he was eligible for a waiver of the tax penalties. 1a9 Under section
502(b)(1) of the Code, 0 0 a claim may be disallowed if it "'is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor under any agreement
or applicable law. . ..."20 The court observed that, outside bankruptcy,
enforceability of the tax penalties would be governed by sections
6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(2), and 6654 of the Internal Revenue Code.202 Therefore, the bankruptcy court was required to determine the allowance or
disallowance of the penalties under those provisions of the Internal Reve203
nue Code.
Because the Internal Revenue Code does not allow for partial waiver of
penalties under sections 6651(a)(1) or 6651(a)(2), "the bankruptcy court
may not use its equitable powers to reduce the amount of the penalties by
194. 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1988).
195. 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1988).
196. 979 F.2d at 1511-12; 26 U.S.C. § 6654(a) (1988).
197. 979 F.2d at 1512. The debtor was eighty-six years old. When he retired from his
business in 1980, he left his financial affairs to his then-wife, thirty-nine years his junior,
and her accountant. The debtor developed serious health problems in 1983, and his wife
filed for divorce in May 1984. Id. at 1511-12.
198. Id. at 1512-13.
199. Id. at 1515.
200. I U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988).
201. 979 F.2d at 1512 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988)).
202. Id. at 1513.
203. Id. Sections 6651(a)(1) and 6651(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code allow a taxpayer to escape penalties if the failure to file returns or to timely pay taxes was "due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect." Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1), (2) (1988)).
Under 26 U.S.C. § 6654(e)(3)(A) (1988), the penalties for underpayment of the estimated
tax may be waived "to the extent the Secretary determines that by reason of casualty, disaster, or other unusual circumstances the imposition of such addition to tax would be against
equity and good conscience." 979 F.2d at 1514 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6654(e)(3)(A) (1988)).
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partially disallowing them.""' Similarly, under the facts of this case, the
penalty under section 6654(a) of the Internal Revenue Code had to be
waived or imposed in full. 2 0 ' Since the bankruptcy court cannot exercise

its equitable power in contravention of section 502 or any other section of
the Code, the bankruptcy code did not have the power to equitably reduce the penalties outside the 2purview
of the statutory waiver provisions
06
in the Internal Revenue Code.

C. Tax Returns by a Liquidating Trustee
The Eleventh Circuit decided in Smith v. United States (In -re
Holywell Corp.)20 7 that a liquidating trustee was not required to file federal income tax returns or pay federal income taxes. The Supreme Court
subsequently reversed that decision in Holywell v. Smith.2 "8
The question before the court in Tambay Trustee v. Pizza Pronto,Inc.
(In re Pizza Pronto, Inc.)209 was whether an accountant retained by a
Chapter 7 trustee- to prepare federal income tax returns for the bankruptcy estate was entitled to compensation for services rendered.2 10 The
lower courts had denied the accountant's application for compensation
under the holding of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Holywell that tax
returns for the bankruptcy estate were unnecessary.2 Since the reversal
of Holywell by the Supreme Court undercut the basis for denying the
accountant's compensation, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the accountant was properly engaged by the Chapter 7 trustee to prepare tax
returns and remanded
the case for further proceedings on the application
212
for compensation.

VIII. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE

Property of the bankruptcy estate is broadly defined in section 541(a)
of the Code.21 3 Section 541(c)(1)(B) of the Code"' expands the reach of
204. 979 F.2d at 1513.
205. Id. at 1514. Although the waiver provision in 26 U.S.C. § 6654(e)(3)(A) is flexible,
allowing waiver "to the extent" the penalties would be inequitable, under these facts, if
there was cause to justify part of the underpayment, the entire underpayment would be
justifiable, Id.
206. 979 F.2d at 1513-14.
207. 911 F:2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).
208. 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).
209. 970 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1992).
210. Id. at 784.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (1988). This section provides:

19931
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the bankruptcy estate by nullifying certain forfeiture clauses in contracts.

In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Camp (In re Government Securities Corp.),"' the Eleventh Circuit held that section
541(c)(1)(B) of the Code applies with full force in the liquidation of a
securities broker under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.2"
Government Securities Corporation ("GSC"), a securities broker, became the subject of a liquidation proceeding in district court under the
Securities Investor Protection Act. 17 The district court granted the application for liquidation, appointed a trustee, and referred the case to the
bankruptcy court for administration.'" 8 One of the assets claimed by the
trustee was a fidelity bond issued by National Union Insurance Company
of Pittsburgh ("National. Union"), against which the trustee filed a proof
of loss for employee dishonesty. National Union refused coverage under a
provision in the fidelity bond which purported to terminate or cancel the
bond "'upon the taking over of [GSC] by a receiver or other
liquidator.'

"219

The trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against National
Union, arguing that the bond remained enforceable, notwithstanding the
appointment of a trustee to liquidate GSC, by virtue of section
541(c)(1)(B) of the Code.220 The trustee contended that this Code section
was applicable to a liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection
Act through 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b), which provides: "'To the extent consistent with the provisions of [the Securities Investor Protection Act], a [Securities Investor Protection Act] liquidation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with, and as though it were being conducted under
chapters 1, 3, and 5 and subchapters I, and II of chapter 7 of [the Bank(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the
debtor in property becomes property of the estate ... notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law (B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a
custodian before such commencement, and that effects or gives an option to
effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in
property.
Id.
215.
216.
Act").
217.
218.
219.
220.

972 F.2d 328 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 329; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988) (the "Securities Investor Protection
972 F.2d at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee,
ruptcy Code].' ,,221
and the district court affirmed.222
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the conclusion of the lower courts that
section 541(c)(1)(B),of the Code was applicable to a liquidation proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act, relying upon the plain
language of 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) 22 and the intent of the Securities Investor Protection Act to maximize the recovery of assets to distribute to the
customers of brokerage firms in financial distress. 2 ' Thus, the forfeiture
clause in National Union's fidelity bond was unenforceable to bar any recovery by the trustee.22
IX. EXEMPTIONS
A.

Homestead Exemption

In Owen v. Owen (In re Owen),226 the Eleventh Circuit decided, on remand from the Supreme Court,227 that a debtor could not avoid a judicial
lien under section 522(f)(1) of the Code228 based on its interpretation of
the judicial lien and the homestead exemption under Florida law.22 9
Helen Owen obtained a judgment against her former husband, Dwight
Owen, for $160,000 in 1975. The judgment was recorded in Sarasota
County, Florida, in July 1986, even though Dwight Owen did not own any
real property in Sarasota County at that time. However, in 1984, Dwight
Owen purchased a condominium in Sarasota County. One year later,
Florida amended its homestead law to qualify the condominium for a
homestead exemption. Dwight Owen filed a Chapter 7 petition .in1986
221.

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1988)).

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

972 F.2d at 329-30.
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 330.
961 F.2d 170 (11th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Owen v. Owen, 495 U.S. 929 (1990), to re-

view the Eleventh Circuit's decision in In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989). 961 F.2d at
171. The case was remanded, Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991), for the circuit court to
consider whether the judgment lien attached to an interest of the debtor in property, and if
so, whether extension of the Florida homestead exemption resulted in a taking of a property
interest. 961 F.2d at 172.
228. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1988). This section provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)
of this section, if such lien is (1) a judicial lien;

Id.
229.

961 F.2d at 173.

. ..

19931

BANKRUPTCY

1099

and sought to avoid the judgment lien of his ex-wife under section
522(f)(1).2s0 The bankruptcy court, district court and Eleventh Circuit all

231
declined to avoid the lien.
Under Florida law, the judgment lien of Helen Owen immediately attached to the condominium in Sarasota County when it was acquired by
Dwight Owen in 1984.232 "Therefore, there was never a fixing of a lien on
an interest of the debtor, as the debtor had no property interest prior to
the fixing of the lien. ' 23 3 As the Supreme Court held in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot,3 4 "'unless the debtor had the property interest to which the
lien attached at some point before the lien attached to that interest, he or
she cannot avoid the fixing of the lien under the terms of section
522(f)(1).' ,,235 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion
that the judgment lien could not be avoided."

B. Annuity Contract
The case of LeCroy v. McCo~lam (In re McCollaM)23 7 addresses another exemption issue under Florida law. The question presented was
whether an annuity contract established in settlement of a tort claim in
lieu of a lump sum payment was within the scope of the Florida exemption statute, 38 which, on its face, appears to exempt all annuity contracts
from creditor claims.2 3 ' Rather than attempting to answer this question of

230. Id. at 171-72.
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 154 Fla. 304, 14 So. 2d 667 (1943)). "'A judgment lien is a general lien which attaches to any property currently owned by the judgment
debtor. It springs to life the minute the debtor acquires property to which it attaches.'" Id.
at 172 (quoting Allison on the Ocean, Inc. v. Paul's Carpet, 479 So. 2d 188, 190-91 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985)).
233. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
234. 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991).
235. 961 F.2d at 172 (quoting 111 S. Ct. at 1829.)
236. Id. at 173.
237. 955 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1992).
238. FLA. STAT. § 222.14 (1989). This section provides:
The cash surrender values of life insurance policies issued upon the lives of citizens or residents of the state and the proceeds of annuity contracts issued to citizens or residents of the state, upon whatever form, shall not in any case be liable
to attachment, garnishment or legal process in favor of any creditor of the person
whose life is so insured or of any creditor of the person who is the beneficiary of
such annuity contract, unless the insurance policy or annuity contract was effected
for the benefit of such creditor.
Id.
239. 955 F.2d at 678.
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state law, the. Eleventh Circuit certified the issue to the Supreme Court of
2 40

Florida.

The debtor, Paula L. McCollam, entered into a settlement with Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") arising from the wrongful death
of her father. In relevant part, the settlement provided that the debtor
was entitled to receive monthly payments of $1,320, subject to a three
percent annual increase, and to receive five periodic lump sum payments
between the years 1988 and 2006 ranging from $25,000 to $250,000.241
Two years after entering into the settlement, the debtor had an automobile accident that subjected her to a tort claim. Upon the filing of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the debtor argued that the proceeds of
the settlement with Travelers were exempt. The creditor asserting the
claim from the automobile accident objected to the debtor's schedule of
exemptions. 2 2 The bankruptcy court and district court both concluded
that the contract with Travelers fell within the broad language of the annuity exemption in the Florida statute.""
The objecting creditor argued on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit that
the contract with Travelers was merely a structured stream of payments
in settlement of a debt, not a true annuity.2 4 " According to the Eleventh

Circuit, courts in other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to the
Florida statute in question do not exempt annuity contracts established
in settlement of debts.24 In the absence of a Florida court decision on

point, the Eleventh Circuit opted to let the Supreme Court of Florida
interpret the annuity exemption statute under these facts.2

6

C. Avoidance of Nonpossessory, Nonpurchase-Money Security
Interest
2'4 7
In Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. Freeman (In re Freeman),
the debtor,

James Freeman, was an auto mechanic. Some time before June 1987, the
debtor began purchasing tools from a Snap-On dealer under a revolving
account. The debtor purchased additional tools in February 1988. At that
time, the dealer assigned its interest in the revolving account to Snap-On,
and Snap-On financed the purchase under an extended credit agreement.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 679.

242. Id.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 681.
956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992).
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The security under the
"8 extended credit agreement included tools from
the revolving account.
The debtor thereafter continued to buy tools on the dealer's revolving
account. Second and third financing agreements were entered into between the debtor and Snap-On in July and November, 1988, respectively.
The list of tools included in a UCC-1 financing statement filed by SnapOn in November 1988, included an air ratchet and an impact wrench purchased prior to the first extended credit agreement. " "
The debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition in February 1989, which was
later converted to ,a case under Chapter 7.20 The debtor filed a motion 25to
avoid Snap-On's lien on the tools under section 522(f)(2) of the Code.
Under that section, the debtor may avoid a lien that: (1) impairs an exemption to which the debtor is entitled, (2) is a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest, and (3) applies to certain types of personal
property, including tools of the trade2" Alabama law allows a debtor to
exempt personal property, including tools of the trade, worth up to
$3 ,0 00.s Both the bankruptcy court and the district court concluded
that Snap-On did not have a purchase-money security interest in the
tools, making avoidance of the lien possible."8 4
The issues before the Eleventh Circuit were whether the consolidations
by Snap-On destroyed the purchase-money character of its security interest, and whether Snap-On's agreement with the debtor contained an adeqtiate method of allocating payments to preserve the purchase-money
character of the security interest.8 8 The court stated that, if an item of
248.
249.

Id. at 253.
Id.

250.

Id.

251. Id. at 254; 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988). This section provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)
of this section, if such lien is -.
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry
that are held pimarily for the personal, family, or household use
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of. the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2)(A), (B), (C).
252. 956 F.2d at 254 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A)).
253. Id.; ALA. CODE §§ 6-10-6, 6-10-126 (1975).
254. 956 F.2d at 254.
255. Id.
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collateral secures an antecedent debt, the creditor does not have a
purchase-money security interest in the collateral.2 5 The fact that the
tools purchased by the debtor under the dealer's revolving account purmilitated against the finding of a
ported to secure the debt to Snap-On
257
purchase-money security interest.

The dispositive factor, however, was that the "first-in, first-out"
method in the financing agreements for allocating payments to Snap-On
was inadequate to determine which tools had been paid for and which
remained as collateral to secure Snap-On's indebtedness.2 8 As the Elev-.
enth Circuit previously held, "'[u]nless the lender contractually provides
some method for determining the extent to which each item of collateral
secures its purchase money, it effectively gives up its purchase money status.' ,,259 After the loans were consolidated, this determination could not

be made. 2 0 Accordingly, the decision of the lower courts were affirmed,
and Snap-On's lien was avoided.2 1
X.

APPEALS: MOOTNESS

The case of First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Investments
v. Club Associates (In re Club Associates)202 addresses the doctrine of
mootness in the context of the appeal of an order confirming a Chapter
11 plan of reorganization.2 The debtor, Club Associates, owned and operated an apartment complex. The principal secured claim was a $22 million wrap-around note payable to First Union Real Estate, Equity and
Mortgage Investments ("First Union"). On September 18, 1989, more
than two and one-half years after its Chapter 11 filing, the debtor obtained confirmation of its plan of reorganization.2 64 The plan allowed the
debtor to continue its ownership and operation of the apartment complex
by restructuring the wrap-around note. Under the plan, the debtor was
required to: (1) raise at least $487,500 from its limited partners or new
investors through a supplemental securities offering by the effective date
of the plan; (2) pay all administrative expense claims by the effective date
of the plan; (3) pay trade creditors eighty percent of their claims within
thirty days after confirmation; and (4) fulfill certain other contractual re256. Id. at 255 (citing In re Fickey, 23 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn. 1982)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting SouthTrust Bank of Ala. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d
1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 1985)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1992).
263. Id. at 1066.
264. Id. at 1066-67.
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sponsibilities, including assumption of a ground lease, repayment of tenant security deposits, assumption of a management agreement, restructuring of another note, and assumption or rejection of a satellite master
license. In the event the debtor failed to raise the required $487,500
within the specified time, the plan contained a self-destruct mechanism
which would have permitted First Union to foreclose on the apartment
complex without opposition.2
First Union filed a timely notice of appeal from the confirmation order
on October 18, 1989. On November 30, 1989, after the debtor filed a certificate that it had raised the requisite capital, First Union moved for a
stay pending appeal in the bankruptcy court. In the meantime, First
Union filed its second motion for relief from the automatic stay in the
bankruptcy case, which the bankruptcy court denied on December 15,
1989. First Union filed a timely appeal from that order, and both appeals
by .First Union were consolidated. On April 4, 1990, the bankruptcy court
denied First Union's motion for a stay pending appeal. Then, on April 26,
*1990, First Union filed a motion in the district court for a stay pending
appeal. The debtor filed a counter motion in the district court to dismiss
both of First Union's appeals for mootness and reasons of equity.2" The
dismissed the appeals, and
district court granted the debtor's motion and 267
First Union appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit confined its analysis to the issue of mootness. 21s
Generally, mootness involves "a determination by an appellate court that
it cannot grant effective judicial relief." 209 In a confirmation setting, the
mootness doctrine focuses on "whether the 'reorganization plan has been
so substantially consummated that effective relief is no longer available.' ",,20 The Eleventh Circuit described the test for mootness as a balancing of "the equitable considerations of finality and good faith reliance
on a judgment and the competing interests that underlie the right of a
party to seek review of a bankruptcy court order adversely affecting
him., 71
In applying this test, substantial consummation of a plan, by itself, is
not dispositive. 2 Rather, the appellate court must make a more thorough
265. Id. at 1067-68.
266. Id. at 1067.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1068 n.9.
269. Id.at 1069.
270. Id.(quoting Miami Ctr. Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of N.Y., 820 F.2d 376, 379 (11th
Cir. 1987)).
271. Id. (citing In re Information Dialogues, Inc., 662 F.2d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1981)).
272. Id.
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evaluation of whether judicial relief remains available.27 Among the relevant factors are the following:
Has a stay pending appeal been obtained? If not, then why not? Has the
plan been substantially consummated? If so, what kind of transactions
have been consummated? What type of relief does the appellant seek on
appeal? What effect would granting relief have on the interests of third
relief affect the re-emergence of
parties not before the court? And, would
7
the debtor as a revitalized entity?2 '
After considering these factors, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
investors who committed new funds to the debtor could not be protected
if the confirmation order was reversed on appeal.2' For that reason, the
appellate court was not able to render effective judicial relief, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of First Union's appeals on the
grounds of mootness.' 6
The mootness issue also arose in Shapiro v. Saybrook Manufacturing
Co. (Matter of Saybrook Manufacturing Co.),'"7 but in a different manner.27 6 The bankruptcy court had approved Texlon-type cross-collateralization as part of a post-petition financing arrangement.7 When the objecting unsecured creditors appealed to the district court, the district
court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of mootness because the objectors were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain a stay pending appeal.280 The section of the Code at issue was section 364(e),'2' which generally gives finality to financing orders, notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal, unless a stay pending appeal is obtained.28' "The purpose of
this provision is to encourage the extension of credit to debtors in bank273.
274.
275.

Id. at 1069 n.11.
Id.
Id. at 1070.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 1071.
963 F.2d 1490 (l1th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1492-93.
Id. at 1491-92.
Id. at 1492.

281. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1988). This section provides:
(e) The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under this section
to obtain credit or incur debt, or of a grant under this section of a priority or a
lien, does not affect the validity of any debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so
granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith, whether or not such

entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed pending
appeal.

Id.
282. 963 F.2d at 1492-93.
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ruptcy by eliminating
the risk that any lien securing the loan will be mod''28
ified on appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit deferred consideration of the mootness issue
under section 364(e) until it reached the central issue on appeal-whether'
section 364 authorized the type of cross-collateralization approved by the
bankruptcy court.8' The court answered that question in the negative,
concluding that cross-collateralization was not permissible.2 85 Having
made that determination, the court further concluded that section 364(e)
was not applicable, hence the appeal was not moot.'" Saybrook makes
clear that a creditor extending post-petition financing outside the provisions of section 364 may not receive the protection normally afforded by
section 364(e) if the financing arrangement is set aside on appeal.

283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 1492.
Id. at 1493.
Id. at 1493-96. See supra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
963 F.2d at 1496.

